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Once in oﬃce, politicians in parliament enjoy an incumbency advantage. If an oﬃce-
holder is of higher quality than his challengers, the incumbency advantage is welfare-
improving.1 However, less able oﬃce-holders might also be reelected because voters may
be unable to recognize their lack of ability.
To improve the selection of candidates in a democracy, we introduce the idea to require
higher vote thresholds for incumbents. Incumbents competing for reelection would then
need to reach a vote-share threshold above one-half in order to be reelected. If the
incumbent does not obtain enough votes to reach the vote-share threshold, either his
challenger is elected, or a run-oﬀ ballot between two new candidates takes place. In this
paper, we explore the consequences of higher vote thresholds for incumbents.
2. The Model
We consider a simple two-period model. At the beginning of each of two periods,
t = 1 and t = 2, voters elect a politician. The same two candidates compete for oﬃce
on both election dates. Candidates are denoted by k or k0 ∈ {R,L}. Candidate R (L)
is the right-wing (left-wing) candidate. The ability of a candidate is a random variable
ak distributed uniformly on [−A,A], A > 0. Nature draws ak at the beginning of period
1, which is private information. There is a continuum of voters. A voter is indexed by
i ∈ [0,1]. There are two types of policy problems.
• Public Project: P
In each period the oﬃce-holder can undertake a public project. The amount of
this public project in period t is given as
gt = γ(ekt + ak),γ > 0, (1)
where ekt represents the eﬀort exerted by the policy-maker in period t and ak
represents his ability. Voters observe gt and derive utility from the public project
in accordance with the instantaneous utility function UP(gt) = gt.
• Ideological (or Redistribution) Policy: I
In each period the policy-maker decides on an ideological policy I that aﬀects
voters diﬀerently. The choice set for I is represented by a one-dimensional policy
space [0,1]. We assume that voters are ordered according to their ideal points




i (ikt) = −(ikt − i)
2, (2)
where ikt is the platform chosen by the policy-maker and i is the ideal point of
voter i.
1See Samuelson (1984), Londregan & Romer (1993), Banks & Sundaram (1998), Zaller (1998), Ash-
worth (2005), and Diermeier, Keane & Merlo (2005). Challengers may even be deterred from running
against incumbents as discussed in Jacobson & Kernell (1983), Cox & Katz (1996), Stone, Maisel
& Maestas (2004), and Gordon, Huber & Landa (2007).
1Some remarks are in order here. In our model, the advantage the incumbent may
have when he stands for reelection is that he can try to signal his ability to voters by
choosing a particular output g. We next describe the utilities of voters and candidates.
The discount factor of voters and politicians is denoted by β with 0 < β ≤ 1.
The expected utility of voter i evaluated at the beginning of t = 1 is given by the
discounted sum of the beneﬁts from the public project and from the ideological policy.
The lifetime utility of voter i if candidate k (k‘) is in oﬃce in period 1 (2) is given by
Vi = g1 + U
I
i (ik1) + β[g2 + U
I
i (ik‘2)]. (3)
The candidates derive utility from two sources.
• Oﬃce-holding: A policy-maker derives private beneﬁts b from holding oﬃce, in-
cluding monetary and non-monetary beneﬁts such as power and enhanced career
prospects. He incurs costs amounting to C(ekt) = ce2
kt (c > 0) from the exertion
of eﬀort.
• Beneﬁts from policies: We assume that candidate L is a left-wing candidate, i.e.
his most preferred point, denoted by µL with regard to policy I, satisﬁes µL < 1
2.
Similarly, candidate R is a right-wing candidate with an ideal point µR > 1
2. To
simplify the exposition we assume that 1
2−µL = µR−1
2. Hence the candidates’ ideal
points are symmetrically distributed around the median’s ideal point 1
2. Moreover,
the candidates derive the same beneﬁts from public projects as voters.
To describe the overall utility of politicians we have to distinguish four cases. For
example, politician R’s lifetime utility, denoted by VR, can be computed as follows:
(i) If R is in oﬃce over both periods:
VR = b − (iR1 − µR)
2 − ce
2




(ii) If R is in oﬃce in t = 1 only:
VR = b − (iR1 − µR)
2 − ce
2
R1 + g1 + β[−(iL2 − µR)
2 + g2].
(iii) If R is in oﬃce in t = 2 only:
VR = −(iL1 − µR)




(iv) If R never is in oﬃce:
VR = −(iL1 − µR)
2 + g1 + β[−(iL2 − µR)
2 + g2].
We assume that b is not too small such that candidates of low ability are willing to
exert greater eﬀort to increase their reelection chances. To simplify the exposition we
assume β = 1.
2We assume that politicians cannot commit themselves to a policy platform. Voters
observe the policy-maker’s choice with regard to policy I and output g1 but not the
composition of g between eﬀort and ability. They choose the candidate from whom they
expect higher utility. To break ties we assume that voters reelect the incumbent if they
are indiﬀerent between him and the competitor. We are looking for perfect Bayesian
Nash equilibria for the game under these assumptions.
3. Elections Alone
We ﬁrst examine the standard case where elections are held. As a tie-breaking rule
we assume that the probability of either candidate winning in the ﬁrst period is 0.5 if
they both have the same share of votes. In the second period, the incumbent will be
elected if he has 50% of the votes. As candidates cannot commit to policy platforms,
a policy-maker will choose his most preferred platform in the second period. In the
Appendix we prove:
Proposition 1. Suppose candidate k is elected at date t = 2. Then
(i) he will choose ik2 = µk for policy I;




(iii) the utility the policy maker realizes in period 2 is given by




We now look at the equilibria in the ﬁrst period. As the candidates’ ideal points
are distributed symmetrically around the median voter’s ideal point, the probability of
either candidate winning is one half. Once in oﬃce, the candidate has to choose ek1
and ik1. Without loss of generality we assume that candidate R has been elected. We
ﬁrst make a simple observation that will hold in every equilibrium with pure strategies.
Namely, suppose candidate R is elected at date t = 1. Then he will choose iR1 = µR.
This fact follows from the observation that policy-makers will choose their bliss points
in the last period. So politician R will not gain more votes in the second election by
choosing a diﬀerent platform than µR in period 1. We next derive the equilibrium eﬀort
choices made by the oﬃce-holder in the ﬁrst period.
We ﬁrst look at equilibria that divide the types of right-wing candidates into two
groups. The same occurs for left-wing candidates. Such equilibria are called semi-
separating. For this purpose a few preliminary steps are necessary. We ﬁrst construct
a separation of the types of right-wing candidates into two groups as follows: The ﬁrst
group with ability equal to or higher than some critical threshold acut, acut ∈ (−A,A),
expect to be reelected with probability 1. A second group with ability smaller than acut
expects to be deselected with probability 1. An oﬃce-holder with a = acut is indiﬀerent
between being part of the ﬁrst or the second group.
3As a preparation for the formulation of semi-separating equilibria, we examine the
conditions for the indiﬀerence of an oﬃce-holder with a = acut between rejection and
reelection. Without loss of generality we assume that k is a right-wing politician. If he
does not expect to be reelected, his expected utility is given by
V
rejection






− (µR − µL)
2. (4)









cut − (µR − µL)
2. (5)
If he expects to be reelected, his utility is
V
reelection
R = b + γ(eR1 + a
cut) − ce
2





The oﬃce-holder is indiﬀerent between rejection and reelection if V
rejection





R1 − γeR1 +
γ2
2c
− b − γa
cut − (µR − µL)
2 = 0. (7)




4c[b + γacut + (µR − µL)2] − γ2
2c
. (8)
The eﬀort choice of an oﬃce-holder who will be rejected equals
γ
2c. An incumbent who
will be reelected will not choose a lower eﬀort level than an incumbent who will be







4c[b + γacut + (µR − µL)2] − γ2
o
. (9)
After these preparations we can now characterize the set of semi-separating equilibria.
For that purpose we use Ea[g] to denote the beliefs of voters regarding the expected
ability of an oﬃce-holder if he produces output g.
Proposition 2. There exists a continuum of semi-separating equilibria parameterized
by acut ∈ (−A,+A). An equilibrium associated with acut is characterized as follows:
(i) Policy-makers with a < acut choose eR1 =
γ
2c.
Voters perfectly infer their ability and deselect those policy-makers.












4They generate the same output given by γ(eacut + acut) and are reelected.
(iii) The beliefs of the voters are characterized by
α.) Ea(g) = A+acut
2 if g = γ(eacut + acut)
Ea(g) = a if g = γ(
γ
2c + a) and a ∈ [−A,acut)
β.) Ea(g) arbitrary if g > (γ(eacut + acut))





The proof of Proposition 2 is given in the Appendix. The beliefs in (iii)α.) are on the
equilibrium path, while (iii)β.) are conditions for out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Proposition
2 reveals that the selection power of the reelection mechanism may be severely limited.
There are equilibria for which almost all incumbents are reelected. This occurs when
acut is low. We next consider pooling equilibria.
In a pooling equilibrium all oﬃce-holders choose the same output levels. Such equi-
libria are characterized in the following Proposition.
Proposition 3. There exists a continuum of pooling equilibria characterized by output


















4c[b − γA + (µR − µL)2] − γ2.
An equilibrium associated with gp is characterized by
(i) Oﬃce-holders choose eR1 =
gp
γ − a and produce the same output gp.
(ii) All oﬃce-holders are reelected.
(iii) Voters’ beliefs are given by
α.) Ea(gp) = 0
β.) Ea(g) arbitrary for g > gp
Ea(g) < 0 for g < gp
The proof of Proposition 3 is given in the Appendix. Again, conditions in (iii)β.)
restrict out-of-equilibrium beliefs.
We note that voters remain uninformed about the ability of candidates in pooling
equilibria. As a consequence, all incumbents are reelected. This represents an extreme
case where the election mechanism has no power to select able candidates for public
oﬃce. As discussed in Gersbach (2009), the set of equilibria can be reduced by applying
plausible reﬁnements.
4. Vote-Share Thresholds
5In this section we assume that the public sets a reelection threshold for incumbents m
with 1
2 ≤ m ≤ 1. The interpretation is as follows: If politician k takes oﬃce in t = 1, he
must win a share of votes at least equal to m at the next election if he wants to retain
oﬃce. Otherwise the challenger will take oﬃce.
For the following analysis we assume that a candidate k, say R, has been elected and
that the vote-share threshold has been set at m with m ≥ 1
2. In the second period the
choice regarding P and I by R (if he remains in oﬃce) or by L (if he enters oﬃce) will
remain the same as in Proposition 1. Hence we can concentrate on the ﬁrst period.
For the ﬁrst period we assume without loss of generality that candidate R has been
elected. We obtain
Proposition 4. Suppose m > 1
2. Then,
(i) pooling equilibria do not exist.
(ii) semi-separating equilibria parameterized by acut exist if and only if acut ≥ acrit(m),
where the critical quality level acrit(m) is given by
a
crit(m) := −A +
2
γ
(2µR − 1)(2m − 1). (11)
The proof of Proposition 4 is given in the Appendix. We note that acrit(m) is larger
than −A and monotonically increasing in m. For m = 1
2 we obtain acrit = −A, and all
semi-separating equilibria exist.
Proposition 4 shows that higher thresholds for incumbents destroy pooling equilibria
and eliminate semi-separating equilibria where the average ability of reelected incum-
bents is low. The reason is that an incumbent can only gain a vote share that exceeds
50% marginally if his perceived average ability exceeds zero.
5. Conclusion
The main insight of this paper is thus that higher vote thresholds can increase the
selection power of elections. A welfare assessment of higher vote thresholds needs to
account for their eﬀects on eﬀort and is conducted in Gersbach (2009).
6Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. The ﬁrst point is obvious. The optimization problem of the
oﬃce-holder regarding his eﬀort choice is given by
max
ek2






2c. The expected utility of a policy-maker at the beginning of period














Proof of Proposition 2. Step 1. Oﬃce-holders with a < acut could mimic the output
generated by incumbents with a ≥ acut in order to get reelected. Mimicking requires an
eﬀort level
eR1 = eacut + a
cut − a, (12)
which would yield a utility
V
dev
R1 = b + γ(eacut + a
cut − a + a) − ce
2




This will be smaller than its equilibrium utility
VR1 = b +
3γ2
4c
+ γa − (µR − µL)
2 (14)




+ γa − (µR − µL)
2 > b + γ(eacut + a
cut − a + a) − ce
2







R1 − γeacut +
γ2
2c
− b − γa
cut − (µR − µL)
2 > 0. (16)
As a < acut, we have eacut < eR1. Since the left-hand side of (16) is zero for eR1 = eacut
by construction of eacut, the deviation is not proﬁtable.
Step 2. Candidates with a ≥ acut could choose to lower their eﬀort, thereby risking
a deselection. Suppose that an oﬃce holder with a = acut considers to lower eﬀort.
Equilibrium utility is given by
VR1 = b + γ(eacut + a
cut − a + a) − ce
2









R1 = b +
3γ2
4c
+ γa − (µR − µL)
2. (18)
Deviation is not proﬁtable if
ce
2
R1 − γeacut +
γ2
2c
− b − γa
cut − (µR − µL)
2 ≤ 0. (19)
As a ≥ acut, we have eacut ≥ eR1. Again, the left-hand side of (19) is zero for eR1 = eacut.
Hence the deviation is not proﬁtable.
Step 3. Voters’ equilibrium beliefs about utility and voting decisions are given as
follows:
• If output is γ(eacut+acut), expected ability is given by Ea(γ(eacut+acut)) = A+acut
2 >
0 and oﬃce-holders producing this output are reelected.
• If output is γ(
γ
2c+a) with −A ≤ a < acut ≤ 0, voters will believe that the candidate
has ability a and he will be deselected because his ability is below-average.
• If output is below γ(eacut+acut) and out of the equilibrium, voters will believe that
candidates’ ability is below zero.
• If output is above γ(eacut + acut), then the belief of voters is arbitrary.
Proof of Proposition 3. If he plays the equilibrium strategy, the utility of a politician
with ability a is given by
V
pool
















If he deviates to a slightly higher eﬀort eR1 =
gP
γ − a + ², his utility would amount to
V
hdev
















with ² being a small positive number. Such a deviation is not attractive if V
pool





























− (µR − µL)
2. (24)
There will be no downward deviation if V
pool
R1 ≥ V ldev
















4c[b + γa + (µR − µL)2] − γ2
i
. (25)
The condition has to hold for all a ∈ [−A,+A]. The worst type a = −A will not want













Moreover, the comparison of V
pool
R1 and V ldev
R1 provides another condition that has to









4c[b + γA + (µR − µL)2] − γ2. (27)
As this condition is less strict than condition (22), g
p
low is given by equation (23).
Proof of Proposition 4. (i) We show that pooling equilibria in which all policy-makers
are reelected with certainty do not exist for m > 1
2. The expected ability of an oﬃce-
holder in a pooling equilibrium is zero. The median voter is indiﬀerent between reelecting
the oﬃce-holder and electing a new candidate. This would imply that no oﬃce-holder
can obtain a share of votes equal to m, as they get 50%.
We note that no pooling equilibrium exists in which policy-makers expect that they
will not be reelected. Oﬃce-holders would choose the same eﬀort level, but the outputs
would be diﬀerent, and voters could perfectly infer their ability. This is a contradiction.
(ii) We now look at semi-separating equilibria. With m > 1
2, candidate R is reelected
only if voter i = 1−m prefers to vote for him, which implies that all voters with i > 1−m











) − (µL − (1 − m))
2. (28)





(2µR − 1)(2m − 1) − A := a
crit. (29)
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